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Introduction
The early stages during the transforma-tion of Breslau into Wrocław were some 
of the most trying times that the European 
city has seen in its nearly thousand-year 
history. The Second World War left Europe 
devastated, and the Eastern and Western por-
tions of the continent chose different paths 
towards recovery from the destructive war. 
The question of Poland’s borders and leader-
ship stood at the forefront of many post-war 
conversations between the Allies. The end of 
the Second World War brought up the ques-
tion of whether or not to maintain Poland’s 
territorial integrity: Where exactly should 
the borders be drawn? And what ethnic 
composition should a post-war Poland have? 
At the war’s end, the Soviet government 
already had troops on the ground in Po-
land, because of this, Western allies such as 
Britain and the United States had little room 
to maneuver during negotiations.1 When the 
Soviets decided that they wanted to shift 
the entire country of Poland westward, the 
Western allies had little choice but to agree. 
After negotiations, The USSR annexed 
most of what was Eastern Poland, and, in 
replacement, they gave Poland most of what 
had previously been Eastern Germany.2 
The abrupt and hasty nature of the region’s 
transfer from Germany to Poland sets the 
1 Admiral William D. Leahy, “Notes on the Yalta 
Conference”, The Wisconsin Magazine of History 38, 
no. 2 (1954): 72, 112.
2 See Image 1 in Appendix. Retrieved from United 
States Holocaust Memorial Museum.
stage for the transformation of Breslau into 
Wrocław. 
The early period in the new Western Po-
land was commonly referred to as the “Wild 
West” because of the massive upheavals that 
happened as the region changed hands. This 
turmoil enveloped most of the province of 
Silesia, which is where the city Breslau, now 
Wrocław, is located. The city will henceforth 
be referred to as “Wrocław” in this article. 
Silesia was and still is a center of industry, 
and its historical capital has always been 
Wrocław. Wrocław had not been Polish ter-
ritory since roughly the 14th century, so the 
reintroduction greatly surprised the Western 
Allies.
One great example of the change which 
occurred in this city is the Iglica, the spire 
that was placed in front of the Centennial 
Hall in Wrocław in 1948 by the Polish Com-
munist Government in anticipation of the 
Exhibition of Recovered Territories.3 The 
Iglica is shaped like a tripod and was de-
signed by Stanisław Hempel. It was original-
ly 106 meters tall, and the designer indicated 
that the spire was meant to represent na-
tional unity built on the alliance of workers, 
peasants, and working intelligentsia.4 The 
Centennial Hall, the main structure standing 
behind the Iglica, was designed by German 
3 Thank you to Professor Nathan Wood, University of 
Kansas, for bringing this landmark and his original 
ideas about its symbolism to my attention.
4 “Iglica.” Visit Wrocław, Oficjalny serwis turystycz-
ny, https://visitWrocław.eu/miejsce/iglica, (October 
15, 2019).
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architect Max Berg and began construction 
in 1911 when Wrocław was still German 
territory. It was a massive architectural feat; 
at the time of its construction it stood as 
the largest reinforced concrete dome in the 
world, and it represented a state-of-the-art 
use of metal in structural consolidation.5 
The Centennial Hall was meant to be 
used as an exhibition hall, place of assem-
bly, and even as a sports venue. The German 
government put a lot of time, money, and 
effort into creating this display of German 
wealth, power, and architectural prowess. 
When Poland gained control of Wrocław, the 
presence of this landmark tapped into an un-
5 “Centennial Hall in Wrocław”, UNESCO World 
Heritage Centre, https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1165/, 
(October 15, 2019). 
dercurrent of resentment towards Germans 
that resulted from the war. The Poles were in 
unfamiliar land and constantly surrounded 
by the remnants of its previous inhabitants, 
and, as such, they found ways to adapt the 
area to their needs, even if it meant putting 
up a monument of their own that did not 
match the architectural style or achieve any 
of the accomplishments of the German mon-
ument standing behind it. After the Iglica 
was put up, the magazine Przekrój claimed 
that the spire was “a symbol of industry in 
the West” and that it was “hard to find a 
better of symbol of change.”6 The visuals in 
an advertisement for a Ballet in 1948 fo-
6 L. Wolanowski, “Iglica I Dobrzy Restaurato-
rzy,” Przekrój Issue 171, https://Przekrój.pl/en/archi-
ve/artykuly/7303?f=numer, (October 22, 2019), Par 1.
Poland Territorial Losses and Gains, 1945. Retrieved from the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum.
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cused on the newly built spire in front of the 
Centennial Hall without including the main 
structure behind it.7 The praise and attention 
that the spire received did not result from 
architectural or aesthetic accomplishments, 
rather, they were concerned with the spire 
as a symbol of making Wrocław Polish. The 
resentment behind the construction of the 
spire is the same motivation that guided both 
individual Poles and the Polish Government 
when incorporating Wrocław into Poland, 
and it is a large part of what caused the 
transfer to be bloody and chaotic. 
The transformation of Breslau into 
Wrocław from 1945-1948 was one of the 
biggest turning points for the city in its 
history. The city was forced under Polish 
sovereignty despite having been German 
for hundreds of years prior, and this set the 
stage for it to be turned upside down. The 
7 Balet, Chór, Orkiestra Domu Wojska Polskiego z 
Warszawy. Photograph. Wrocław, 1948. See Image 2 
in Appendix. Retrieved from Biblioteka Uniwersytec-
ka we Wrocławiu. 
ethnic composition of the city was trans-
formed thereby contributing to widespread 
social unrest and the civil and state adminis-
trations were ineffective and focused on the 
wrong problems. These two factors tended 
to combine and compound, and this led to a 
detrimental experience for most involved.    
Civilian Perspectives
The civilian experience is complicated 
during the transformation of Breslau into 
Wrocław. This occurs for a multitude of rea-
sons including post-war prejudices, desires 
for revenge, confusion caused by mass mi-
gration in and out of Wrocław, and the impo-
sition of a communist society onto the “new” 
Polish city. The confluence of these factors 
eventually led to widespread social unrest.  
One of the most important civilian 
aspects of this transformation is the mass 
migration of people both into and out of 
Wrocław that resulted after the Second 
World War. The ethnic composition of 
Wrocław changed drastically from 1945-
1948. The goal of the Polish Communist 
government was to create an ethnically 
homogenous nation state,8 and, because of 
that, ethnic minorities in Polish territory, 
namely Germans, were removed. At the end 
of December 1945, “only 33,297 Poles were 
registered in Wrocław, compared to five 
times that number of Germans,” and, “nine 
months later, the positions had been almost 
exactly reversed: 152,898 Poles against 
28,274 Germans.”9 As Germans were ex-
8 Joanna Talewicz-Kwiatkowska, “Persecution and 
Prejudice Against Roma People in Poland after World 
War II”, The Polish Review 64, no. 2 (2019): 40.
9 Norman Davies and Roger Moorhouse, Microcosm 
Portrait of a Central European City, (London: Pimli-
co, 2003), 419.
Balet, Chór, Orkiestra Domu Wojska Polskiego z 
Warszawy. Observe the emphasis on the spire
in the top right and left corners of the advertisement. 
Retrieved from Biblioteka Uniwersytecka we
Wrocławiu.
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pelled from the city, Poles arrived from all 
over Eastern Europe. They were relocated 
by force and often arrived from areas that 
“had been violently torn apart by military 
action, social engineering, successive geno-
cides, ethnic cleansing, political purges, 
and plain banditry.” The Soviet government 
used Catholicism and the ability to speak 
Polish as the twin criteria to decide who was 
Polish; this caused many mistakes when ex-
pelling people from the USSR and sending 
them to Poland.10 The Polish Government’s 
plan to move Germans out and to settle 
Poles coming in was executed with extreme 
speed. A newspaper article from the Chica-
go Daily Tribune highlighted the fact that 
3,000 Germans had left Poland in one day in 
1946, and that the plan was to be rid of 1.5 
million Germans in a span of five months.11 
At the same time that this was happening, 
Poles and Soviet defined Poles were pouring 
into Poland. In 1946 alone, 130,000 people 
arrived in Wrocław.12 
The new arrivals in Wrocław were not 
separated in any meaningful way, which 
only furthered social tensions in the recov-
ering city. According to historian Gregor 
Thum, the chaos resulting from mass migra-
tion led to “professors living under the same 
roof as illiterates”13 as people were quickly 
and sloppily assigned abandoned homes to 
live in. Historian Padraic Kenney referred 
to Wrocław as “a camp filled with migrants 
10 Ibid, 425-426.
11 “3,000 Germans Leave Poland for Allie Zones,” Chi-
cago Daily Tribune (1923-1963), Feb 26, 1946.
12 Alicja Maciaczyk, Statystyka Wrocławia w Latach 
1945-199, (Wrocław: Urząd Statystyczny, 2000), 17.
13 Gregor Thum, Uprooted: How Breslau Became 
Wrocław during the Century of Expulsions, (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 178.
from all over Poland and Europe.”14 The 
hastiness of the movement of people into 
and out of the city fostered widespread con-
fusion which fomented social unrest during 
this period. Poles from all over Eastern 
Europe were moved to a city with which 
they were unfamiliar and lived with peo-
ple coming from vastly different countries, 
ethnic backgrounds, economic backgrounds, 
and war experiences. The goal of this pro-
cess was to create an ethnically homogenous 
Poland, but it soon became very clear that 
what had been created was a “conglomer-
ate of different communities not conducive 
to the formation of broader allegiances of 
class or even of nation,”15 and that “there 
had never been an ethnically homogenous 
Poland.”16 This was one of the first signs that 
this experiment may have led to what may 
be perceived as negative repercussions.
The Second World War left the nation in 
rubble, and the difficulties endured by Poles 
during the Holocaust and during combat 
took a lasting toll on the civilians of the 
country. As soon as the Poles had control 
of the city, German civilians that chose to 
stay were “subjected to the extremes of both 
deprivation and humiliation. Starving, sick, 
and stupefied, they bore the full brunt of the 
pent-up collective anger and contempt that 
Soviets and Poles alike had harboured.”17 
According to Bishop Johannes Kaps, a 
German Bishop from the Archdiocese of 
Wrocław, Germans who remained in the city 
were “dreadfully maltreated by the Polish 
14 Ibid. 
15 Padraic Kenney, Rebuilding Poland Workers and 
Communists, 1945-195, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. 
Press, 2012), 138.
16 Thum, Uprooted, 180.
17 Davies & Moorhouse, Microcosm, 408.
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militia.”18 He claimed that Germans were 
often forced to work long hours for free, 
received less food than others, and that “no 
German’s life was safe if he appeared on the 
street.”19 
The bloodthirsty treatment of German 
civilians remaining in Wrocław can be 
explained by exploring the Polish attitudes 
towards the war. The Polish people were 
subjected to a level of brutality and depriva-
tion that took both a physical and mental toll 
on them during and after war. Poland was in-
vaded by both the USSR and Nazi Germany 
at the beginning of the war and it had death 
camps set up and operated on its soil which 
exterminated millions of Jews and Poles. 
Warsaw, the capital, was razed to the ground 
by the Germans following a failed uprising, 
and Poland was then forced by the Soviets 
to adopt communism after the war.20 During 
the war, Poles were required to house Ger-
man soldiers and were often times required 
to do forced, unpaid labor for the Germans.21 
They too were slaughtered in the streets, 
discriminated against, oppressed, abused, 
and looted from. This does not justify Polish 
actions against Germans following the war, 
but the prevailing attitude towards remain-
ing Germans was one of apathy at best and 
antipathy at worst. 
Many Germans, including Bishop Kaps, 
the German bishop from the Archdiocese of 
Wrocław, still believed that the territory was 
18 Ibid. 
19 Johannes Kaps, The Tragedy of Silesia 1945-46 ; 
a Documentary Account with a Special Survey of the 
Archdiocese of Breslau, (Munich: Christ Unterwegs, 
1952), 137.
20 Mitchell Orenstein, “Poland: From Tragedy to Tri-
umph”, Foreign Affairs 93, no. 1 (2014): 23.
21 Henryk Kapturczak, Wspomnienia z Okresu Oku-
pacji, (Poznań, 1947), Family Document.
rightfully German.22 Poles viewed this as 
further taunting after the atrocities commit-
ted against them during the war. The leading 
Polish opinion on the matter was that the 
Germans simply being allowed to leave was 
a preferable alternative to the treatment they 
received. Many Poles never had the option 
to leave and were killed or sent to concen-
tration camps.23 Because of this, Poles had a 
strong desire for “a Polish historical land-
scape in the western territories purged of all 
German traces.”24 
Another factor that contributed to the 
particularly brutal treatment of German 
civilians was what historians Davies and 
Moorhouse describe as a “palpable cli-
mate of impermanence” in Wrocław and 
the Western Territories as a whole.25 Poles 
were acutely aware of the fact that many 
Germans held attitudes similar to Bishop 
Kaps’, and it led them to “never really settle 
into their new surroundings.”26 Many of 
them longed for their familial homes in the 
East. This feeling only accelerated Polish 
mistreatment and persecution of remaining 
Germans. The longing for home and feeling 
of misplacement added to the already nega-
tive predisposition towards Germans due to 
the war. After having their homes torn apart 
by war, Poles were forced to move into the 
homes of the people they believed to have 
caused them this suffering. The Poles that 
now resided in Wrocław felt a need to assert 
themselves, and they likely expected that the 
Germans would soon return to reclaim the 
22 Kaps, Tragedy, 32-33.
23 Anna Cienciala, “Poles and Jews Under German 
and Soviet Occupation, September 1, 1939 - June 22 
1941”, The Polish Review 46, no. 4 (2001): 393.
24 Thum, Uprooted, 250.
25 Davis & Moorhouse, Microcosm, 417.
26 Thum, Uprooted, 186.
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territory and retaliate. Poles likely wanted 
to assert themselves as the new and rightful 
owners of the now Polish territory, and they 
likely believed they could discourage future 
retribution from the Germans through fear.27 
Reconciliation with and apologies to Ger-
mans were not the goals of Poles moving 
into Wrocław at this time. Their methods 
were violent, but the motivations behind 
them stem from scars that resulted from the 
war.
The final factor that contributed to 
civilian chaos during the transformation of 
Breslau into Wrocław was the imposition of 
a communist society onto the newly Polish 
city. The Polish Communist government 
intended for Wrocław to be a part of “the 
Poland of the future, where social relations 
were reconstructed in a communist con-
text.”28 Many of the people who moved to 
Wrocław were “rural, young, poorly edu-
cated, and inexperienced,” causing party 
membership to center around creating a 
worker’s culture and community.29 Commu-
nism was unpopular with Poles, and “doubly 
so after Soviet misconduct in 1939-41,”30 
but Wrocław presented a unique opportunity 
to create a communist society because Com-
munism was seen as helping to bring order 
to the general chaos. It gave people who 
felt no sense of community or fellowship a 
common goal. 
Civilians were encouraged to connect 
communism with Polish nationalism. A 
propaganda poster from the time shows a 
mile marker decorated with both traditional 
27 Arthur Westermayr, “The Psychology of Fear.,” The 
Open Court Vol. 1915, no. 4 (1915): 250.
28 Kenney, Rebuilding, 136.
29 Ibid, 173.
30 Davies & Moorhouse, Microcosm, 411.
Polish symbols and various communist sym-
bols.31 It was intended to connect the idea of 
the land being rightfully Polish to the idea of 
Poland as a communist regime. Besides the 
Soviet requirements of speaking Polish and 
being Catholic, many of the new residents 
of the city did not have a lot in common and 
likely were not in favor of communism to 
begin with. The imposition of communism 
and the creation of a communist society 
where one had not previously existed likely 
only added to the social unrest of the city at 
the time. Most now had to adapt to a society 
being restructured around a Soviet econom-
ic scheme which was likely different from 
ones they had lived in previously. This only 
furthered the social tensions of the city at the 
time. 
The civilian perspective on the transfor-
mation of Breslau into Wrocław can best be 
described as complicated and chaotic. Mass 
migration following the war completely 
redefined the ethnic composition of the city. 
It forcibly uprooted people from the East 
and dumped them into one central location 
while forcing them to coexist. Amidst these 
changes, Polish people were to adapt to a 
new communist society, to deal with leftover 
wartime history, and to hastily develop com-
munity in their new, assigned homes. These 
factors led to widespread social unrest, 
violence, the shared and intangible feeling 
of anxiety, a feeling of unbelonging, and a 
difficulty recovering from the experiences of 
war.
31 Ulotka Propagandowa: Wystawa Ziem Odzyska-
nych. Photograph. Wrocław, 1948. See Image 3 in 
Appendix. Retrieved from Biblioteka Uniwersytecka 
we Wrocławiu.
46
Administrative Perspectives
The Soviets presented Poland with 
a unique and oftentimes difficult chal-
lenge when it came to the incorporation of 
Wrocław into the Polish state. The city was 
war torn, but not completely destroyed. It 
had been German for hundreds of years, 
and nearly everything in the city including 
the architecture, infrastructure, and culture 
reflected German culture. There was a stark 
difference between the picture of Wrocław 
that was painted by state propaganda and the 
city’s reality; efforts to incorporate the city 
were not smooth or well calculated. 
Immediately after the war, the Polish 
government came to realize that they had 
inherited a very German city that was still 
stuck in wartime turmoil. The Ministry of 
the Recovered Territories, headed by PPR32 
secretary Władysław Gomułka, “oversaw 
reparation, settlement, local administration, 
and the incorporation of the territories into 
Poland.”33 The city was restructured quickly 
despite the large effort that was required to 
do so. In 1945, “nowhere was there a feature 
that one could, without hesitation, recognize 
as Polish,”34 and “more than 30,000 place 
names, tens of thousands of natural fea-
tures… as well as hundreds of thousands of 
streets and squares were to be given Polish 
names.”35 During the time of Soviet occupa-
tion, the Red Army had put up signs in Cy-
rillic script which meant that many streets, 
landmarks, and buildings already had two 
names by the time Poland had to rebrand 
the area, one in German and one in Russian. 
They now were renamed for the third time 
in a span of nearly ten years. This caused 
difficulties in doing repairs, for example, 
since the administration could not find the 
correct addresses due to confusion caused by 
the constant renaming of the same locations. 
The city’s German past permeated it deeply 
and even made it difficult for the administra-
tion to conduct basic operations.   
After the rebranding, from 1945-46 
the city of Wrocław only had 11 primary 
schools serving 1250 total students,36 one 
high school serving 908 students,37 and one 
institution of higher learning serving about 
2900 students.38 Considering 130,000 people 
32 Short for Polska Partia Robotnicza (Polish Work-
er’s Party). 
33 Kenney, Rebuilding, 137.
34 Ibid.
35 Thum, Uprooted, 244. 
36 Maciaczyk, Statystyka Wrocławia, 57.
37 Ibid, 61.
38 Ibid, 65.
Wystawa Ziem Odzyskanych. This advertisement 
for the Exhibition of Recovered Territories combines 
both traditional Polish imagery with communist 
imagery including the hammer and wheat. Retrieved 
from Biblioteka Uniwersytecka we Wrocławiu.
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arrived in Wrocław in 1946 alone,39 it’s clear 
that the education system was insufficient 
and it is very likely that many children were 
not going to school. In addition to this, the 
city’s public transportation was in shambles. 
In 1947, the city only had 151 trams and 
5 busses to serve 73.7 million yearly pas-
sengers.40 The civil administration also had 
to deal with “buildings and wall fragments 
continually collapsing, [leftover] mines, 
unexploded bombshells, munitions depots 
blowing up,” widespread rubble sickness,41 
and “weapons and ammunition literally 
[laying] in the streets.”42 This combined with 
the “relative lack of trained police” made 
entire portions of the city uninhabitable.43 
Neighborhoods in the Western and Southern 
portions of the city served as “hideouts for 
entire gangs,”44 looters, and anyone who 
wanted to remain off the radar. Among other 
difficulties, the administration was strug-
gling to police the city, educate its residents, 
and provide them with public transportation.
When presented with this delicate sit-
uation, the civil and state administrations 
floundered. The civil administration was 
plagued with internal power struggles and 
inefficiency. The city laid in wait as “no 
ration cards were issued until November 
1945” and “most factories did not begin 
operation until early 1946.”45 This stand-
still left the new inhabitants hungry and out 
of work in unfamiliar territory. The new 
communist, government-owned factories 
promised to house, feed, clothe, and enter-
39 Ibid, 17.
40 Ibid, 110.
41 Thum, Uprooted, 177.
42 Ibid, 183.
43 Kenney, Rebuilding, 141.
44 Thum, Uprooted, 183.
45 Kenney, Rebuilding, 144.
tain their workers46 since the betterment of 
workers was supposed to be the focus of a 
communist government. These promises 
were delivered late. The PPR “succumbed to 
the same bureaucratic temptations as did the 
other councils and unions,” and “activists 
saw themselves as representatives of party 
leadership, neither responsive to nor respon-
sible for the local situation.”47 The adminis-
tration took no responsibility for what was 
occurring in the city at the time. Instead, it 
retreated into bureaucratic entanglements 
that were only further exacerbated by the 
situation on the ground. 
When later taking action, the administra-
tion’s choices had a tendency to backfire. As 
a result of the rapid expulsion of Germans 
from Wrocław, the city’s supply of skilled 
labor was rapidly depleted. The situation 
became so dire that the State Ministry of 
Industry was forced to begin a program of 
industrial sponsorship where factories in 
other cities were assigned one in Wrocław 
and told to populate its labor and administra-
tive core with its own employees.48 Facto-
ries in other cities responded by sending 
expendable employees. This led to factories 
in Wrocław being populated with workers 
from other cities while locals struggled, and 
it ensured that the administrative cores of 
these factories were composed of expend-
able workers. Those workers were expend-
able because of their lower quality of work, 
otherwise they would not have been sent to 
Wrocław by the factories previously em-
ploying them. Placing these workers into po-
sitions of authority in factories in Wrocław 
worsened working conditions. 
46 Kenney, Rebuilding, 163.
47 Ibid, 147.
48 Ibid, 143.
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The one area in which the civil admin-
istration excelled was in the production of 
propaganda. Newspapers loudly proclaimed 
that bridges were being built on a large 
scale,49 jobs and opportunities were plen-
tiful, and that conditions were ideal. They 
also “trumpeted Wrocław ‘firsts’ – first tram 
line, first newspaper, first cinema,”50 among 
other accomplishments. The city of Wrocław 
had already had all of these things in place 
when it was still a German city; they were 
just damaged or destroyed by the war. The 
communist party wanted to take credit for 
more than just reconstruction. The admin-
istration even spent hundreds of millions of 
dollars to host an Exhibition of the Recov-
ered Territories in 1948 while the city itself 
suffered. The administration was intent on 
painting Wrocław as something it objec-
tively was not. Opinions on Wrocław were 
“not much higher in Warsaw or Cracow than 
[they were] in Berlin or Hamburg.”51 One 
of the only places Wrocław was recognized 
as a robust city rife with opportunity was in 
the propaganda offices of the civil and state 
administrations. 
The administrative perspectives on the 
transformation of Breslau into Wrocław 
tell a story of inefficiency and apathy. The 
administration failed to provide a basic 
standard of living for the residents of the 
city at this time. The city was unsafe due 
to a lack of policing, its residents were 
hungry and out of work at times, and there 
was no initiative to continue the education 
of the city’s populace. In addition, public 
transportation was in shambles, buildings 
49 “Budujemy Mosty,” Trybuna Robotnicza. July 29, 
1946, 205 edition.
50 Kenney, Rebuilding, 141.
51 Davies & Moorhouse, Microcosm, 431.
were unsafe to live in, money was spent on 
propaganda instead of reconstruction efforts, 
and factories were populated with laborers 
from other cities. Both the civil and state 
administrations chose to take a step back 
and not involve themselves in any meaning-
ful way, and, when they did involve them-
selves, their actions often led to unintended, 
negative consequences. The civil and state 
administrations were indisputably presented 
with a complex problem to untangle when 
incorporating Wrocław into the Polish state. 
The city had been ravaged by war, and it had 
been a German city for hundreds of years. 
Furthermore, transitioning a city to fit into 
a communist blueprint is another challenge 
that the administrations had to face. The 
choices made by both the civil and state ad-
ministrations to deal with the issues present-
ed to them ranged from creating propaganda 
to inaction.
         
Connections Between Civilian & 
Administrative Perspectives
The civilian and administrative perspec-
tives on the transformation of Breslau into 
Wrocław tell two different, yet interconnect-
ed stories about how the city transitioned 
from German to Polish territory. The civilian 
perspectives tell a tale of hardship and cha-
os. The administrative perspectives show-
case the inefficiency in communist bureau-
cracy. The two combined and compounded 
where issues in one segment would further 
issues forming in the other.
The first connection observable between 
these two is the civil administration’s hands-
off approach to policing and maintaining 
order within the city. This helps to explain 
the actions of the Poles towards the Ger-
49
mans that chose to remain in the city. The 
merciless killing and mistreatment of Ger-
mans by Poles that occurred in this period 
would not have been a possibility if the civil 
administration could have upheld the rule 
of law. The Poles harbored intense feelings 
of hatred following the war, and they were 
uncomfortable with their new surround-
ings. It was an already volatile situation that 
eventually led to Poles acting out. Failing 
to properly police the city could have been 
the result of negligence, a lack of resources, 
or both. It is highly plausible that in doing 
nothing, the civil administration encouraged 
the killings by allowing those that partook in 
them to walk away unscathed.    
The second connection that can be ob-
served is that between crime and the absence 
of jobs in the city. Wrocław became home 
to many thieves in this period, and the parts 
of town that they inhabited were unsafe. The 
war ended in May of 1945, and the migrants 
from Eastern Europe began pouring into 
Wrocław shortly after. Some viewed the city 
as a source of opportunity and came for that 
reason, but most were expelled from their 
homes in the East and relocated to Wrocław 
by force. Ration cards were not distribut-
ed until November of that same year, and 
factories did not begin production until 
1946. There certainly is a possibility that 
some people came to Wrocław specifically 
to loot, but, given these circumstances, some 
people likely turned to crime because there 
were no other options. People still need to 
eat, and they need ways to be able to pay for 
food. Without factories and ration systems in 
place, these conditions could have contribut-
ed to the prevalence of crime in the city. The 
communist government was expected to care 
for its citizens and provide them opportuni-
ties, and, when it failed to do so in a timely 
manner, those same citizens likely did what 
they had to in order to survive, even if it was 
illegal.
Another connection that can be made 
when comparing the two perspectives is how 
the lack of a common identity among the 
newcomers prompted targeted propaganda 
from the administration. People arriving 
in Wrocław came from all kinds of ethnic, 
regional, and economic backgrounds, and 
the administration was aware of this fact. 
The only commonalities many of them 
shared was the ability to speak Polish and 
the Catholic religion. In smaller communi-
ties and neighborhoods, “the most important 
institution was the church,”52 but beyond 
that, the administration likely saw an oppor-
tunity to try to foster a new sense of shared 
national identity though communism. This 
can explain why propaganda posters depict-
ed traditional Polish symbols together with 
hammers and sickles and why newspapers 
constantly boasted about the achievements 
of the communist government. The goal was 
to present communism as both a positive 
influence on the country and as a unifying 
force for the new inhabitants of Wrocław. 
The administration likely hoped that ci-
vilians would read the headlines, see the 
posters, and then come to believe that the 
communist brand they saw could be the new 
unifying force to alleviate social unrest. 
Exploring the connections between the 
civilian and administrative perspectives of 
this transformation show that the two were 
interrelated, and that they tended to follow 
logical cause and effect patterns. Influenc-
52 Kenney, Rebuilding, 163.
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es ran both ways; the chaos and hardship 
experienced by civilians prompted an oppor-
tunistic administration to push propaganda, 
and the inaction of the administration only 
furthered the suffering of the inhabitants of 
the city. 
The Lasting Impact, Moving Forward, 
and Conclusions
The lasting impact of the transformation 
of Breslau into Wrocław affected gener-
ations of Poles to come. The remnants of 
Wrocław’s previous German inhabitants 
constantly surrounded the new inhabitants, 
and, as decades came to pass, they came to 
accept them along with the city’s history. 
Olga Tokarczuk captures this experience in 
her novel House of Day, House of Night. 
She herself is a Polish woman who ended up 
moving to and living near Wrocław decades 
after the war. The novel is a collection of 
short stories and experiences, and the casual 
way in which German remnants of the city 
appear to the characters in the novel reflect 
the experiences of Poles growing up in or 
near Wrocław after the war. A young Polish 
child is casually described as being pushed 
along a path by his sister in “an old German 
pram,”53 discovering a German automobile 
while exploring in the forest,54 and playing 
in “houses that were abandoned by the Ger-
mans.”55 Additionally, the main character at 
one point comes to the realization that it was 
a German family that originally built the 
house in which she had been living.56 People 
53 Olga Tokarczuk, House of Day, House of Night, 
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2003), 
12.
54 Ibid, 26.
55 Ibid, 18.
56 Ibid, 92.
growing up in Wrocław after the transition 
faced similar, repeated occurrences. German 
lab equipment was still used in schools, 
abandoned German bunkers became slides 
for children during the winter, and German 
greenery was still present throughout the 
city.57 Many of the generations of Poles 
growing up surrounded by these remnants 
of German history knew that these buildings 
and objects were German but never paid 
them too much mind.58
 This marks a distinct shift in attitude 
and a departure from the anti-German bit-
terness that plagued the initial transforma-
tion of Breslau into Wrocław. The postwar 
generations of Poles who inhabited Wrocław 
likely felt less of a need for revenge and 
less of a need to assert themselves than the 
previous generation because they did not 
experience the war or any of the atrocities 
associated with it. It was likely easier for 
postwar generations to cope due to a lack of 
firsthand experience. They were able to be 
indifferent to the material remnants of the 
city’s German past unlike those who experi-
enced the war firsthand. It could be argued, 
however, that future generations were so 
indifferent precisely because only material 
remains were left. 
Their indifference could also be ex-
plained by the shift of attitudes regarding 
Wrocław’s status as Polish. In the decades 
following this transition, Poles growing 
up in or around the city had no reason to 
believe that the city was not Polish. It was 
ethnically almost 100% a Polish city with 
streets, churches, and parks all rebuilt by 
Poles. History was erased as the city was in-
57 Conversation with Professor Justyna Beinek. Sep-
tember 25, 2019. Bailey Hall, University of Kansas.
58 Ibid.
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corporated into Poland, and, because of this, 
people growing up in this environment had 
no reason to doubt that the city was Polish 
and that it would remain that way. During 
the initial transformation of the city, howev-
er, the exact opposite attitude was prevalent. 
Many in 1945-1948 believed that the city 
would not remain in Polish hands for long, 
and, as a result of this, the existence of rem-
nants of the previous German inhabitants 
caused bitterness and anxiety. Future gener-
ations of Poles growing up in Wrocław did 
not have these same anxieties. They were 
able to take on an attitude of indifference 
because the Wrocław they knew was defin-
itively Polish, and the material remnants of 
German inhabitants were viewed as nothing 
more than fossils. 
The transformation of Breslau into 
Wrocław from 1945-1948 taught the Polish 
nation a hard lesson about itself, and it can 
also be used as an example of the complexi-
ties in a transfer of sovereignty. Coming out 
of the war, the common Western and Polish 
attitudes towards Poland’s wartime was one 
of pity and sorrow. The invasion of Poland 
had begun the war, the Holocaust took place 
on Polish soil, uprisings were crushed, 
and war crimes were committed against 
the Poles by both Germany and the Soviet 
Union. After being put through all of this, 
Poles decided to flip whatever abuse they 
could back onto the Germans remaining in 
their new territory. This certainly challenges 
the idea that Poles were nothing more than 
victims of the war. It is clear that they were 
guilty of participating in the same behav-
ior that the Germans were when given the 
chance, and it is also clear that their acute 
desire for revenge was a primary consider-
ation during this period of the transforma-
tion. 
In the short span of three years, the eth-
nic composition of the city was completely 
transformed. This alone would have been 
enough to place any major city into a state 
of confusion, but when this transition was 
combined with the traumas associated with 
the aftermath of the Second World War, the 
imposition of communism in the city, and 
an inept civil administration, it unraveled 
and challenged the city. Poles mistreated, 
looted from, and killed many Germans that 
chose to remain in the city. They felt few 
ties to fellow residents, little connection to 
their new homes, and little to no sense of 
belonging in the newly Polish city. They 
also struggled to feel loyalty to the ineffec-
tive communist government that presided 
over them. Both the civil and state adminis-
trations failed to provide a basic standard of 
living for their people for months at a time 
which was largely a result of bureaucratic 
entanglements and mismanagement of time, 
effort, and money. The problems in admin-
istration only served to further the suffering 
of the civilians, and the chaos of the civilian 
experience caused the already clumsy ad-
ministration to focus any constructive efforts 
on mainly the wrong problems. This resulted 
in a generally miserable experience for those 
involved.  
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